

their tyrants in the manner which becomes them: (24) and, two days afterwards, the celebrated orator Carra, said, likewise, to the National Convention, "ye know, that the stroke, by which the head of Louis is about to fall, *will make the heads of the other despots totter.*" (25) And, after the fatal catastrophe had taken place in France, Danton, speaking of Kings in general, said, only two days before the declaration of war against Great Britain: "You have thrown them the gauntlet; this gauntlet is the head of a King: *it is the signal of their approaching death.*" (26)

(24) Apprenez aux peuples à punir leurs tyrans d'une manière digne d'eux. *Moniteur*, 6 Dec. 1792.

(25) Vous sentez que le coup, qui va faire tomber la tête de Louis XVI. *va faire chanceler celles des autres despotes.* *Moniteur*, 8 Dec. 1792.

(26) Vous leur avez jeté le gant: ce gant est la tête d'un Roi: *C'est le signal de leur mort prochaine.* *Moniteur*, 1 Fev. 1792.

Even so early as the 21st of November, the President of the National Convention, Gre-goire, in a speech, which was translated into all languages,(27) and was published, two days after the celebrated decree, as a manifesto of all nations against their Sovereigns, had declared, " It was a glorious day *for the uni-*
"*verse*, when the National Convention of
" France pronounced these words, "*royalty*
"*is abolished.*"

That, in making these, and numerous other declarations of the same kind, the rulers of France had their eyes directed particularly to Great Britain, is too apparent to stand in need of additional proof, since the whole of the preceding history contains one continued demonstration of it. All doubts, however, on this subject, should any really

27. An English translation of it is printed in Riving-ton's Annual Register, 1792, part ii. p. 356.

remain, will be removed by the speech, which was uttered by Carra, in the National Convention, on the 2d of January : a speech, which is so much the more remarkable, as it was not only insolent in the extreme toward the British Government, but was delivered at the opening of the negotiation between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, and proved, therefore, or at least might have proved, at that very time, to the world at large, that it was not the object of the National Convention, to produce a reconciliation with the British Cabinet. (28) “ Your
 “ courage (said Carra) will rouse all nations,
 “ and they will soon wish to have their
 “ 10th of August, their Convention, and
 “ their Republic. Already has George III.

(28) Brissot's insolent speeches of the 1st and 12th of January, which were likewise delivered during the negotiation, afford an additional proof of this assertion. See the *Moniteur*, 3d and 15th Jan. 1793. Specimens of these speeches have been already given in Ch. xii. Note 34, and in Note 17 to the present chapter.

“ *commad*

“ commanded the Tower of London to be
 “ fortified. * Need we more, to enable us to
 “ predict the destruction of this new Bas-
 “ tile? Need we more, to enable us to fore-
 “ see the overthrow of royal and noble ty-
 “ ranny in England. The human species
 “ commenced with infancy: it now ap-
 “ proaches toward manhood. Form not
 “ then your judgment of what you have to
 “ fear by the preparations in England, and
 “ by the comedy now played by the Parlia-
 “ ment in concert with the Court: and be
 “ assured, that it is not the real intention of
 “ the Court to make war on us, but mere-
 “ ly to intimidate the National Conven-
 “ tion. (29) Let, therefore, the head of
 Louis fall; and George III. with his Minis-

(29) This acknowledgment, *that it was not the in-
 tention of the British Cabinet to make war on France*, from
 one of its most violent enemies deserves particular at-
 tention, and, above all, the attention of those, who have
 represented Ministers as taking every opportunity, be-
 fore the war broke out, of *repelling peace*. With re-

gard

“ter, Pitt, will feel if their heads rest firm on
 “their shoulders. (30) Then will the Par-
 “liament of England (31) no longer hesitate
 “to demand an alliance with the French
 “Republic. The same fate will attend the
 “other despots: and shortly will every na-
 “tion say; the head of our tyrant is not
 “more divine than that of Louis; let us
 “strike it off, therefore; let us abolish roy-
 “alty; let us imitate the French in every
 “thing; and cries of *vive la liberté! vive*
 “*l’égalité! vive la république!* shall re-

gard to their alleged endeavours to intimidate the Na-
 tional Convention, every Briton, who loves his country,
 must thank them for attempting to prevent the execu-
 tion of its avowed projects.

(30) Fortunately for Great Britain, their heads have
 rested firm on their shoulders, long since the heads of
 Carra and his associates have fallen to the dust.

(31) Namely, when metamorphosed into the Na-
 tional Convention, announced on the 28th of No-
 vember.

found in every quarter of Europe." (32) By speeches like these, and still more by actions,

(32) "Votre courage donnera l'éveil à toutes les nations, et tous voudront avoir bientôt leur 10 Août; leur Convention et leur République. Déjà George III. a fait fortifier la Tour de Londres. En faut-il davantage, pour prédire, la destruction de cette nouvelle Bastille? en faut-il davantage, pour prévoir le renversement de la tyrannie royale et nobiliaire en Angleterre? Le genre humain a commencé par être enfant; il commence aujourd'hui à devenir, un homme. Ne jugez donc point de ce que vous devez craindre par les préparatifs de l'Angleterre, et la comédie qui s'est jouée dans le parlement de concert avec la cour: et croyez que l'intention de la cour n'est réellement pas de nous faire la guerre, mais seulement d'intimider la Convention Nationale. Que la tête de Louis tombe; et George III. et le Ministre *Pitt* tâteront si la leur est encore sur leurs épaules; alors seulement il n'y aura plus de difficulté dans le parlement d'Angleterre pour demander l'alliance de la République Française. Il en fera de même des autres despotes: bientôt chaque peuple se dira mais la tête de notre tyran n'est pas d'une nature plus divine que celle de Louis; abbattons-la donc; abolissons la royauté; imitons en tout les Français: et vive la liberté! vive l'égalité! vive la république dans toute l'Europe! *Moniteur*, 4 Janv. 1793.

which

which corresponded to them, the republicans of France, republicans who, as Louvet said, were worthy of the name, “aspired at
 “the lasting renown, at the immortal ho-
 “nour of abolishing royalty itself, of abolish-
 “ing it for ever, at first in France, and then
 “throughout the world.” (33).

The confident expectation of the French rulers, that the neighbouring nations were prepared to rebel against their sovereigns, and to make a common cause with those who, under specious and alluring protestations, endeavoured to conceal the infamy and destructiveness of their designs, brought at last the torch of their ambition into open flame. To whatever quarter they directed their attention, they foresaw in imagination the struggles of a civil war: they rejoiced at the combat of parties, which, by weakening

(33) Words of Louvet. See Ch. vii. Note 13.

or destroying the power of both, prepared the way for Gallic despotism: and regarding with a smile of malevolence the folly of devoted victims, who, seduced by all the arts of systematic deception, were operating their own destruction, anticipated the triumph over the expected prey. When ambitious monarchs attempt to gratify their thirst of conquest, they seldom think of subduing more than one country at a time: but such narrow projects of aggrandizement afforded much too little nourishment for the mighty minds of these republican rulers, and before *they* could be gratified, it was necessary, that all Europe should lie prostrate at their feet. Already was Savoy both conquered and incorporated into France: already had they made themselves masters, and even determined on the incorporation, of the Austrian Netherlands: already had they vanquished a considerable part of Germany, had commenced hostilities, as well against the republic

lic

lic of Geneva, as against several states of Italy; and preparations were already made for the conquest of the Swiss cantons. (34) Already had they treated the British Government as an open enemy: (35) and, while they endeavoured to excite insurrection within, had destined a formidable fleet and army

(34) This last fact, though not generally known, admits of no doubt; for General Dumouriez (*Mémoires*, tom. i. p. 110), speaking of Colonel Weiss, and of the events of January, 1793, says: “Son coup d’œil sur les relations politiques de la République Française et du Corps Helvétique, lancé à propos au moment de l’éruption, acheva de déjouer les projets hostiles; et il est très probable, que sans lui la guerre eût été déclaré avant la fin de Février; *divers préparatifs secrets étant déjà, en activité.* Ils se dirigeaient d’après le plan assez mal combiné par Robert, Clavière, et quelques émigrés Suisses, qui déterminaient l’attaque sur trois points à la fois.

(35) The conduct of the French Convention on the 28th of November, was equivalent to a formal declaration of hostilities against the British Government: and to their conduct on that day every measure, which was afterwards taken, perfectly corresponded.

to support their projects from without. (36) And the allies of England, the States General, were not merely threatened, but the order for actual invasion had been already given. Nor was all this sufficient to satisfy the ambitious projects of the French rulers: for Brissot, who considered France, in January, 1793, as more powerful than all Eu-

(36) That thirty ships of the line were ordered on the 13th of January to be put in commission, in addition to the twenty-two already commissioned, has been related in the twelfth chapter. And that the menace of a landing in England, made by the Marine Minister on the 31st of December, was not a mere gasconade, but the result of a serious and deliberate plan, appears from the *Rapport sur l'organisation générale des armées*, delivered in the National Convention on the 25th of January, in which, where the subject relates to England, there occurs the following passage: "Toujours cette puissance a craint une descente; jamais le projet ne s'en est effectué, et il n'a jamais été sérieusement préparé. Mais il fera sans doute suivi avec plus de force et d'énergie sous le régime de la liberté: vous y destinerez 40,000 hommes d'embarquement." *Moniteur*, 27 Janv. 1793.

rope, (37) and not wholly without reason, on account, as well of the general fermentation which then prevailed, as of the want of confidence and union among the cabinets themselves, had formed the plan of conquering likewise, at the same time, Italy and Spain. (38) And, as if Europe were too

(37) In his address, à ses Commetans, p. 75, speaking of the inhabitants of France, he says: "*Ces vingt-cinq millions se trouvaient, même au mois de Janvier dernier, avec des moyens matériels et pecuniaires bien supérieurs à tous ceux des puissances étrangères, même à ceux de cette Angleterre si fière de ses richesses. Ils avaient une masse de ressources, telle que jamais aucune nation n'en a possédée, masse qui se doublait encore, si l'on avait pu faire régner l'ordre; car tout se tenait dans notre plan.*"

(38) "Brissot y étala ses projets de conquérir l'Espagne et l'Italie." *Mémoires de Dumouriez*, tom. i. p. 108. Further says Dumouriez, p. 105, Kellermann, en prenant congé de la Convention, pour aller commander l'armée du Dauphiné, fort d'à-peu-près vingt-mille hommes, indépendamment de celle du comté de Nice aux ordres du Général Biron, qui était

small a theatre for the exercise of the French arms, expeditions were in agitation to the distant regions of Asia and Africa. (39) Even at that time, therefore, the French rulers claimed for France the title which has been since assumed, the title of the *Great Nation*, for which purpose, as Brissot observed, "it
 " was necessary to have vast ideas, grand de-
 " signs, and an object sublime and diffi-
 " cult." (40)

à-peu-près dix à douze mille, avait reçu l'ordre d'aller conquérir Rome, et avait répondu gravement qu'il allait à Rome.

(39) " Il s'agissait dans cette expédition de La Clos, (qui venait d'être nommé commandant dans l'Inde) de s'emparer du Cap de Bonne-Espérance et de Ceylon, pour ensuite se joindre à Tippoo Saïb, et tomber sur le Bengale." Mémoires de Dumouriez, tom. i. p. 105.

(40) " Pour former des hommes, une grande nation, il faut de vastes idées, de grands objets, un but sublime et difficile." A ses Commetans, p. 76.

The rage of conquest, which animated the republican rulers of regenerated France, was distinguished likewise as much by its *kind* as by its *magnitude*. The zeal of converting all mankind to their political and supposed philosophic creed, which, in minds destitute of religion, can operate as fervently as religious zeal in the most determined bigot, excited an enthusiasm, of which modern ages furnish no example, and which can only be compared with that of the followers of Mohammed in the seventh century. Conscious too, like these, of their military prowess, and of their ability to propagate their doctrines by the sword, they had recourse to the measures which had been applied by the Saracens, and determined to impose the system, adopted by themselves, on a conquered world. They formed accordingly the resolution “of breaking with *all* the cabinets, “of setting all Europe at defiance, of setting

“the four corners of Europe on fire” (41)
And, in the heat of their enthusiasm, they

(41) These expressions, which were vauntingly used by the French rulers themselves, have been quoted in the original, Ch. vii. Notes 14, 15, 16. The well-known Camille Jourdan, likewise, in his address, à ses Commettans, which was written in October, 1797, has made, p. 88, the following remarkable confession: “Quel fut le grand *principe* de la guerre, le grand obstacle à la paix? Ne fut-il pas dans nos doctrines révolutionnaires, dans cet insensé projet *de renverser tous les trônes, de bouleverser tous les empires?*” Yet a celebrated opposition writer, speaking of the 24th. of January, 1793, says: “Before this time, France was undoubtedly solicitous for *peace*.—The arguments by which he endeavours, in defiance of the French rulers themselves, to support this notion, are founded, partly on the fine and pathetic expressions which were used in the note of the French Executive Council of the 7th of January, 1793, and partly on the proposal which had been made by Mr. Chauvelin to the British Cabinet as long ago as June, 1792, to act as mediator between France and Austria. Now of those *fine and pathetic expressions* enough has been already said in the preceding chapter, to place their fallacy in the clearest point of view. And of the mediation which was proposed before the depo-
sition

were so confident of success, that, in the decree of the 15th of December, they proposition of Louis XVI., and in his name, it has been shewn in the seventh chapter, that if it be regarded as a request of the National Assembly, it affords a proof of the blackest hypocrisy. But even had it been true, that the republican rulers of France wished for peace in June, 1792, it would surely be very absurd to conclude, therefore, that they entertained the same sentiments six months afterwards, when they were become all-potent conquerors. To corroborate his opinion, the same writer says further, that the National Convention, at least before the meeting of Parliament, on the 13th of December, could have done nothing which even the British Cabinet considered as a ground of war, because war was not proposed in his Majesty's speech. Now, from the circumstance that war was not proposed in his Majesty's speech, we may conclude that it was the intention of the Cabinet to act only on the defensive: but to infer, that, because it did not instantly commence hostilities, there was no reason to suspect an aggression on the part of France, is the very summit of sophistry. We may justly wonder, therefore, that a pamphlet, containing *such* arguments, could meet in Great Britain with so rapid a sale, and make such an impression on a nation, which reasons in general on political subjects more justly than any nation in Europe.

claimed to the whole world their system of universal revolution.

The motives which induced the rulers of republican France to attempt the destruction of all kingly governments, affected the kingdom of Great Britain in an equal degree with any other kingdom in Europe: for kings of every description, whether absolute or limited, (42) were considered by those political zealots as monsters which it was necessary to extirpate. And nothing was at that time more common in the National Convention, than to declaim on the slavery of Britons, and the benefits to be conferred on them by the communication of French freedom. But, beside the *general* motives

In fact, it affords a confirmation of that melancholy truth, that even men of sense may be deceived by the most futile reasoning, when that futile reasoning is veiled in eloquent and spirited language.

(42) See Note 17 to this chapter.

in which Great Britain was included, *particular* reasons induced the French rulers, at the close of the year 1792, to a war with their ancient rival. In the first place, the internal fermentation at that time, which they themselves assisted to the utmost of their power, the numerous addresses from seditious societies, and the civic feasts which were held before their own eyes in Paris, (43) led them to believe, that the insurrection, which they expected in all countries, would break out in Britain. Secondly, the number of ships of war, which France had actually in commission, was superior to the number of those which were ordered to be commissioned in the British ports: and it was imagined, that republican enthusiasm would so animate the French sailors on the one hand, and that disaffection would so pre-

(43) An example of this kind has been quoted in the preceding chapter. Note 76.

vail among the British sailors on the other, that the former would gain an easy victory. Thirdly, the land forces in England, if we except the militia, for which it was supposed the expected insurrection would furnish sufficient employment, did not amount at that time to twenty thousand men: and from the immense army then in the pay of France, twice or thrice that number could be spared, which, if once conducted across the Channel, a matter supposed in France to be very feasible, (44) might, perhaps, under the peculiar circumstances of the time, have succeeded in the attempt to overturn the government, the constitution, and the power of Great Britain. Lastly, till the empire of the sea was wrested from Great Britain, it was impossible that the ambition of the French rulers should ever be gratified: and,

(44) See Note 32 to this chapter, and Note 39 to chapter xii.

on the other hand, it was obvious, that, as soon as the British naval and commercial power was transferred to France, the conquest of the Continent would be rendered easy, and that all Europe would soon lie prostrate at her feet.

CHAP. XV.

Events of the last fourteen Days before the Declaration of War. Mr. Chauvelin's Demand, on the 17th of January, to be acknowledged as Ambassador of the French Republic. Answer of the British Government, that under the existing Circumstances it thought proper not to comply with the Demand. Order sent to Mr. Chauvelin, by the French Executive Council, to return to France. Similar, but later, Order on the Part of the British Government : with the Motives thereto. Copies of the Papers relative to the late Negotiation laid before the States General by Lord Auckland, the British Ambassador at the Hague, who accompanied them with a Memorial on the Conduct of the French Rulers. Message from his Majesty

to the two Houses of Parliament. Apparent Preparations for a new Negotiation made by General Dumouriez. De Maulde's Journey to the Hague, to propose a Conference between Lord Auckland and General Dumouriez on the Frontiers of Holland. Mr. Maret's Departure from Paris, on the 26th of January, for London, where he remained eight Days; but, for want of Instructions from the French Executive Council, again produced no Effect. Departure of Dumouriez from Paris on the same Day, to hold the proposed Conference with Lord Auckland, to which the British Government had consented, but which did not take Place, because the National Convention refused to await the Issue of it, and declared War against Great Britain and Holland on the 1st of February.

THE history of the politicks of Great Britain and France has been already brought down to the middle of January,

1793, and the relative conduct of the two powers, from the time of the conference at Pillnitz, has not only been clearly represented, but the representation has been every where supported by unanswerable documents. It has been proved, on the one hand, that the British Cabinet was so far from acceding to a coalition against France, that it had acted toward that country according to the rules of the most strict neutrality, and even with the utmost friendship. (1) On the other hand it has been shewn, that the French Government repaid this friendship with the blackest ingratitude, that it endeavoured to excite an insurrection in Great Britain, with a view of destroying, not only our constitution, but our existence as an independent

(1) It was impossible for one government to shew a stronger proof of friendship for another, than the firm refusal of the British Cabinet, till war had been declared, to accept the offer made by the French planters in St. Domingo to surrender that valuable colony to Great Britain. See the latter part of Ch. ii.

nation,

nation, and that, while the secret machinations were conducted with all the arts of systematic deception, a formidable armament was prepared in France itself. It has been further shewn, that the measures adopted by the British Government were merely measures of self-defence, that they were not taken till after the French Convention had openly avowed its design of overturning the British Constitution, (2) and that the naval preparations in the ports of Britain were not less than three months posterior to the naval preparations in the ports of France. (3) We have seen, likewise, that, when the relative conduct of the two countries became a subject of negotiation, and the British Cabinet insisted on conditions, which alone could insure the safety of Britain, the French Government not only refused to comply with those conditions, but declared, at the same

(2) See Ch. x. Note 24.

(3) See Ch. x. Note 5, and Ch. xi. Note 44.

time, in the most positive manner; that if, notwithstanding this refusal, the preparations in the British ports were continued, it was determined to commence hostilities. Lastly, it has been proved, in the preceding chapter, that the French rulers, whose measures, during more than two months, had uniformly tended to a war with England, came to a final resolution on the subject, at least before the middle of January, 1793: and the various motives which induced them to it, motives which operated before the period in question, have been fully assigned. As the fate of the two countries, therefore, was now determined, the events of the last fourteen days, before the public declaration of hostilities, which took place on the 1st of February, cannot possibly be reckoned among the *causes* of the war. The real causes had already produced their full effect; and the events which followed could serve only as *pretexts*, or as sophistical arguments to palliate

liate an act of injustice, to which they gave not birth. In a review, then, of the *causes* of the war, they might be safely passed over in silence: but, since whatever concerns the relative conduct of Great Britain and France till the public declaration of war against the former, belongs to the present history, it will be necessary to relate the events of the last fourteen days with the same exactness as the preceding.

On the 17th of January, 1793, though the question of war or peace was fully determined, and the residence, therefore, of a French Minister in London was become wholly useless, Mr. Chauvelin, by order of the Executive Council, demanded, that the Court of Great Britain should formally receive him as the accredited Ambassador of the French republic. (4) Never, perhaps,

(4) That Mr Chauvelin's letter to Lord Grenville, in which this demand was made, was dated the 17th of

was a favour demanded by one government of another at a more unseasonable period than this: for a favour undoubtedly it would have been, if Great Britain, which no power could have forced to a compliance, had given so early an example of a formal acknowledgment of the new republic. To have acquired a claim to such an expression of friendship, this republic should have itself acted with friendship toward Great Britain, should have rested satisfied with the revolution which had been effected at home, and should not have attempted to disturb the tranquillity of its neighbours. If the French republic had really acted in this manner, and, instead of endeavouring to overturn all the kingdoms of Europe, had behaved with becoming moderation, it is not improbable

January, appears from Lord Grenville's answer, which begins thus, "I have received your letter of the 17th instant." But I have not been able to find it in the *Moniteur*, nor in the *New Annual Register*.

that

that the British Government would have acknowledged the French republic, if not in January, 1793, at least as soon as it was settled on so firm a basis as to promise durability to any engagement with it. (5) It is

(5) As the republic of France acted with avowed hostility toward the kingdom of Great Britain, and thus forfeited all pretensions to a formal recognition on the part of the British Government, it is, in fact, unnecessary to inquire whether the latter would have acknowledged the French republic in the year 1793, provided this republic had acted with friendship toward Great Britain and its allies, and had renounced all views of conquest and aggrandizement. No one, however, can assert that the British Government, in that case, would have refused: and the expression used by Mr. Pitt to Mr. Maret, "that it would give him great pleasure to treat with him, *as a confidential person of the French Executive Council,*" (Ch. xiii. p. 22.) and the assurance given by Lord Grenville to Mr. Chauvelin, "*that outward forms would be no hinderance to his Britannic Majesty, whenever the question related to explanations, which might be satisfactory and advantageous to both parties,*" (Ib. p. 4) lead rather to the conclusion, that if satisfactory explanations had been really given by the rulers of the French Republic, the British Go-

true, that in a political light the British Ministers, if they had had the choice, must necessarily have preferred the continuance of a monarchical government in France to the establishment of a republic, not only because great republics, like that of France, are naturally inclined to be both restless in themselves, and to disturb the peace of their neighbours, (6) but because the ambition of government would *not* have refused to acknowledge it. But without such satisfactory explanations, no acknowledgment of this kind could at that time be expected.

(6) It was a strange notion entertained by many in the year 1792, that the conversion of France into a republic would secure the tranquillity of Europe, though the notion is contradicted by the experience of all ages. We need only appeal to the Roman and Carthaginian republics, which displayed a greater thirst of conquest and aggrandizement, than perhaps any monarchy ever did. The instances which have been alleged of the Republics of Holland and Switzerland, are foreign to the purpose. For, in the first place, they were merely federate republics, formed, therefore, only for self-defence,

the new rulers of that country, aided by the energy with which the revolution inspired the French in general, who fondly imagined they were fighting for the establishment of their political liberty, (7) unavoidably rendered France a much more dangerous neighbour to England, than it had ever been un-

fence, whereas the republic established in France was one and indivisible, formed, therefore, for aggression: and, in the next place, they were surrounded with neighbours more powerful than themselves, whereas the very reverse took place in regard to France.

(7) The inhabitants of France, however, have since discovered, that they have been fighting for no other purpose than to establish the power of a new set of governors, whose tyranny is insupportable: and that their efforts have produced no other effect than the exchange of a virtuous sovereign, who loved his subjects, for despots, who treat them as slaves. The enthusiasm, therefore, of the French armies, unless the fertility of invention, which is characteristic of the French rulers, furnishes new means of inflaming it, will hardly be equal in future to that which was displayed at the commencement of the war.

der its ancient government. And his Majesty in particular, as every man in his situation would have done, necessarily felt a certain degree of indignation at the deposition and condemnation of an innocent sovereign. But neither those political reasons, nor this personal indignation, would have occasioned a declaration of war on the part of Great Britain; of war, which arose from totally different causes, as has been fully proved in the preceding chapter, and was not only declared, but *provoked*, by the rulers of France. Besides, had the British Ministry, as their adversaries contend, resolved on a war with France, merely because France was become a republic, (8) they would not have entered

(8). When a certain opposition writer, in order to extort a confession from Government itself, that the war was its own work, and that too, because France was become a Republic, quotes a passage from his Majesty's speech of the 21st of January, 1794, and not only suppresses the words "*an attack was made on us and our allies,*" but even interpolates the verb "*to oppress,*"

into a negotiation with the agents of that republic, and still less would they have proposed conditions under which they were ready to remain in peace with it. They demanded not that the republic should cease, but merely that it should conduct itself with moderation and friendship: and, from the very first establishment of it, had armed neither by land nor by sea, till Great Britain itself was threatened with destruction. When the British Ambassador departed from Paris after the deposition of the King of France, in August 1792, he was particularly charged to declare, that his Britannic Majesty meant to observe the principles of neutrality in every thing which regarded the arrangement of the *internal government of France*: and Le

pose," so as to give the whole passage a different sense, we can hardly ascribe his conduct to mere ignorance. But as it has been already very justly exposed by a sensible and well-informed opponent, it is unnecessary to take further notice of it.

Brun was so satisfied with the declaration, that he said, a few days afterwards, in his report to the National Assembly, the British Ambassador had left *a satisfactory testimony of the sentiments of his Court.* (9) On the 18th of December Mr. Miles, in a letter to Le Brun, again reminded the French Minister, that the British Cabinet was determined not to interfere in the internal affairs of France, and, speaking of Mr. Pitt in particular, he said, “ I dare refer you to all the
“ public and avowed declarations of the
“ English Minister, to convince you that,
“ from the beginning of the revolution, he
“ has made it a point not to meddle with
“ the internal affairs of your government;
“ that he has always rejected with firmness
“ every proposal made to him for attacking the
“ French, (10) and always refused to be con-

(9) See Ch. ix. Notes 1—12.

(10) That the British Cabinet positively refused to join a coalition against France in 1791, appears from
Ch.

“cerned in any project for a counter-revolution.

“As he has made it his duty not to meddle

“with your affairs, so he has made ~~it~~ his

“glory to remain attached to his own wife

“and equitable principles.” (11) The same

system of neutrality, and the determination,

not to interfere in the internal affairs of

France, prevented, likewise, the English from

interceding in behalf of Louis XVI. though

the fate, which awaited him, could not pos-

sibly be a matter of indifference to them,

either in a moral or in a political view. (12)

Ch. i. Note 2: and that the same proposal was renewed by various courts of Europe during the summer of 1792, but that the British Cabinet uniformly answered in the negative, was asserted by Mr. Dundas, in his speech in the House of Commons on the 14th of December, 1792.

(11) Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 80.

(12) Even if the British Government had interceded in behalf of Louis XVI. it is certain, that the intercession would not have produced the desired effect: it would

left the question, whether the British Cabinet would acknowledge the French republic, wholly undetermined, and said, that, when it came to a decision, "the King
 " would have the right to decide according
 " to the interests of his subjects, his own
 " dignity, and the regard which he owed to
 " his allies, and to the general system of Eu-
 " rope." (13) That his Britannic Majesty

wife imagine, that its intercession might have been of service, but, likewise, with the friends of the opposite party, some of whom, with a strange inconsistency, have, likewise, censured the neglect of intercession. Perhaps, however, no argument will satisfy the latter, since their passion for finding fault with the British Ministry carries them so far, as to condemn a conduct, which, on *their* part, at least deserves commendation.

(13) The words of the original are, " La proposition de recevoir un ministre accrédité de la part de quelque autre autorité ou pouvoir en France ferait une question nouvelle, laquelle, au moment où elle se présenterait, sa Majesté aurait le droit de décider d'après les intérêts de ses sujets, sa propre dignité, et les égard qu'elle doit à ses allies, ainsi qu'au système général de l'Europe." *Moniteur*, 14 Janv. 1793.

possessed this right, there can be no doubt : and it is equally clear, that a republic, which threatened destruction to Europe in general, and to Great Britain in particular, had no right to expect to be formally acknowledged. For, it would be the height of folly to contribute voluntarily to the energy of a power, which had already declared itself hostile ; it would be madness for a man to strengthen wantonly the arm which was raised to destroy him. But it has been proved, that the republic of France had determined to annihilate the kingdom of Great Britain, and that the question of war or peace was fully determined before the middle of January. The other question, therefore, whether the French republic should be acknowledged by Great Britain, or not, which, on the 31st of December, had been left undetermined, and subordinate to the issue of the negotiation, was, on the 20th of January, after the negotiation was ended, and the designs of the French

French Government had been fully confirmed, necessarily answered in the negative. Indeed, *under the existing circumstances*, an affirmative answer would have been absurd: and, therefore, Lord Grenville, in his note to Mr. Chauvelin of the 20th of January, said, (14) “ I have already apprized you, (15) “ that his Majesty has reserved to himself “ the right of deciding, according to his “ judgment, upon the two questions of ac- “ knowledging a new form of government in “ France, and of receiving a Minister, accre- “ dited on the part of some other authority “ in France, than that of his Most Christian “ Majesty. In answer to the demand you

(14) The original French note is not printed in the *Moniteur*: but the English translation, which was laid before the two Houses of Parliament, on the 28th of January, 1793, and is therefore as good authority as the original itself, is printed in the *New Annual Register* for 1793, *Public Papers*, p. 75.

(15) *Namely*, in the note of December 31.

“ now

“ now make, whether his Majesty will re-
 “ ceive your new letters of credence, I have
 “ to inform you, that, *under the present cir-*
 “ *cumstances*, his Majesty does not think pro-
 “ per to receive them.”

On this refusal, the republican rulers of France had no right to complain; for not only were they conscious, that their plan of revolutionizing all Europe was known to the British Ministry, (16) but they had declared, on their parts, five weeks before the period in question, *that they acknowledged no kingly*

(16) Brissot, in his report to the Convention on the 12th of January, speaking of the British Ministers, said, “ Ils prévoyaient que cette république pouvait se consolider, et porter le flambeau des révolutions en toute l’Europe.” *Moniteur*, 15 Janv. 1793. As it was avowed, then, that the British Ministers foresaw this, (and their foresight, at a time when so many thousands were struck with blindness, does them great honour) it was, undoubtedly, their duty to avoid a step which would have given additional force to the engine of destruction.

government, (17) and, at the same time, had issued a proclamation, in which they asserted, in unequivocal terms, that it was their design to *expel all Kings*. (18) If under these circumstances, if after the design of overturning the British Constitution had been formally announced in the National Convention, (19) if after the King of Great Britain had been publicly threatened in the same Assembly, with the fate which was

(17) See the Introduction to the decree of December 15th, quoted in Ch. xii. Note 2.

(18) *Ib.* Note 22.—From what has been already said in the present and two last chapters, the reader will easily determine whether the assertion be true, that the British Government refused to receive Mr. Chauvelin on new credentials, *merely* because France was become a republic. It was not the *bare existence* of that republic, but its *destructive character*, which determined the conduct of Administration.

(19) *Ch. x.* Note 24.

then impending over the King of France, (20) and after the late negotiation had ratified both these and numerous other injuries and insults, if under *such* circumstances, the British Government had acknowledged the republic of France, its rulers would have ascribed the acknowledgment, not to a desire of preserving peace, but to the dictates of fear; (21) and Treilhard would have again exclaimed, *Another King in the number of the vanquished! Kings are here the order of the day!* (22) In fact, the French rulers themselves could not seriously expect, that the republic, which was no more dreaded by Great Britain at that time, than it is at present, would be acknowledged, under such

20) Ch. xiv. Note 28.

(21) We have already seen (Ch. xiii. p. 11.) in what manner Le Brun interpreted Mr. Pitt's willingness to confer with Mr. Maret.

(22) See Ch. xiv. Note 17.

circumstances, by the British Cabinet. Unless, therefore, they had been desirous of seeking pretexts for a quarrel, they would not have then proposed the question, but would have left the decision to the effects of time: and hence we may safely infer, that the demand was made with no other view, than on the presumption that it would be answered in the negative, to furnish themselves with at least one plausible argument, and thus colour an aggression, on which they had long resolved. (23)

The refusal, given by the British Cabinet, on the 20th of January, to acknowledge the French republic in the person of Mr. Chauvelin, could hardly have been known many hours to the Executive Council, before they

(23) Mr. Chauvelin made no secret of declaring, that if he was not received at St. James's, *it would be the height of his ambition to leave this country with a declaration of war.* See the *Authentic Correspondence*, p. 84.

sent him an order to return to France: for Dumouriez, in a letter to Miranda, dated Paris, 23d January, speaks of the order for Chauvelin's recall, as already given. (24) Dumouriez, indeed, says nothing in this letter of the above-mentioned refusal of the British Government, and assigns another motive for the recall of Chauvelin, namely, that Dumouriez himself intended to go to England, in order to open a new negotiation. (25) But, whatever was the motive, which induced the Executive Council to recall Mr. Chauvelin, the *fact*, that they did recall him, though it is not generally known, and, moreover, that they signed the order, at the latest, on the *twenty-third* of January, is

(24) His own words are: "*On a donné ordre à notre Ambassadeur Chauvelin de revenir.*" Correspondence du Général Miranda, p. 15.

(25) Of this design, which was not put in execution, more will be said in the latter part of this chapter.

proved,

proved, beyond contradiction, by Dumouriez's letter of that day to Miranda.

On the *twenty-fourth* of January, though the order, which had been given by the Executive Council, could not have been known in London, a similar order was sent to Mr. Chauvelin by the British Government. To this measure the British Government was induced by various and weighty motives. In the first place, after the negotiation was at an end, and the question of war or peace was finally decided, Mr. Chauvelin's residence in London could be of no further use. This was virtually admitted by the French Government itself, in having *already* ordered Mr. Chauvelin to return. (26) It is,

(26) If it be objected, that, according to Dumouriez's letter to Miranda, though Chauvelin was recalled, a new negotiation was intended to be conducted by Dumouriez; it may be replied, that the French Executive Council was so far from taking any part in the new negotiation,

likewise, the usual practice with all Governments, when a negotiation is ended, and either a rupture, or the continuance of hostilities is already settled, to order the Minister of the hostile power to depart from its territories, because his further residence would enable him to furnish his own court with information, which must be detrimental to the other power. But, beside this general motive, there existed a very particular reason for dismissing Mr. Chauvelin, as soon as all hopes of a reconciliation were at an end: for his *personal* conduct was of such a kind, that no Government, under any circumstances, and much less in such a general ferment as then prevailed in England, could have suffered his residence, without exposing itself to imminent danger. Every one must admit, that it is the duty of a foreign am-
negotiation, that they took every possible measure to counteract it, in which they fully succeeded, as will appear in the sequel.

bassador

ambassador to confine his political communications to the court to which he is accredited, and that it is an insult, as well as an injury, to that court, if he forms political connections with persons who act in opposition to it. It is true, that an Opposition party in England, if it conducts itself with moderation and dignity, and, setting aside all chicanery and sophistry, examines with candour the measures of Ministers, is not only entitled to respect, but is a real benefit to the nation. Yet, even to *such* an Opposition party, no foreign Minister has a right to attach himself, and to make the members of it his confidential friends on *political* subjects, since, by virtue of his office, he must confer on matters of state with Ministers, and Ministers alone. But Mr. Chauvelin, soon after his arrival in the spring of the year 1792, formed a close alliance with the members of Opposition, and the longer he staid, the

more close was the connection. His intimacy with the Opposition party appears from his own letter of the 17th of July : (27) and when he was recalled by the Executive Council, at the end of August, he obtained a revocation of the order, by using the following argument : “ *that though he was not well*
“ *with the English Minister, yet he was per-*
“ *fectly so with Mr. Fox and some other mem-*
“ *bers of Opposition, and that it would not be*
“ *prudent in France to lose the fruit of his la-*
“ *bours with these gentlemen, and their subse-*
“ *quent services, for a vain form of diplomatic*
“ *etiquette.*” (28) And, before the negotiation commenced, which has been described in the

(27) In this letter he said : “ *D’après tous les renseignements que je me suis empressé de prendre dès le premier moment que j’en ai eu connaissance, j’ai partagé à ce sujet, et partagé encore, la sécurité de tous les Anglais, même les plus jaloux du gouvernement.* See Ch. viii. Note 3.

(28) Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 83.

thirteenth,

thirteenth chapter, he went so far as to communicate his secret instructions, (in which was positively stated, that the Scheldt would *not* be given up, and yet that an acknowledgment of the French republic should be demanded) to an intimate friend of Mr. Fox. (29)

A conduct like this, even in times of perfect tranquillity, would have excited the suspicion, that it was Mr. Chauvelin's intention, not to preserve peace, but, by secret cabals, to do injury to Government. At a period then, when London was overrun with French apostles of rebellion, when the disaffected party in England spake loudly and vehemently against the Government, when seditious societies publicly proclaimed their design of establishing a British National Convention, and this design was as publicly

(29) *Authentic Correspondence*, p. 84.

encouraged

encouraged by the Convention of France, Mr. Chauvelin's union with men who acted in opposition to Government, whether the object of those gentlemen, considered by itself, were reprehensible or not, afforded an unequivocal proof, that Mr. *Chauvelin's* object was to encourage the insurrection, which was confidently expected by his employers. Nor did his employers make it a secret, that they regarded him as an instrument of sedition: for they commissioned him, first, "to embrace every opportunity of assuring the English nation, that, notwithstanding the ill humour of its government, the French desired nothing more ardently than to merit *its* (the English nation's) esteem; (30) and, secondly, to threaten the British Government with an *appeal to the people*. (31)

(30) See Ch. xii. Note 27.

(31) *Ib.* Notes 29. 32. See also Ch. xiii. Notes 47, 52.

suffered him to stay so long. (33) If a British Ambassador had conducted himself in Paris, as Mr. Chauvelin conducted himself in London, the French Government would certainly not have awaited the issue of the negotiation, but would either have answered his very first note with an order to quit the territories of the republic, or, since the persons of foreign Ambassadors are no more respected by the modern rulers of if possible, to prevent it. But, on the 20th of January, 1793, it was clear, that its efforts were, and must be, fruitless.

(33) Yet it has been said: that the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin shut the door to all negotiation. Now, when a negotiation has been kept open, till the questions in dispute have been brought to a decision, as has been fully proved in the thirteenth chapter, *that* party alone can be justly said to have shut the door to the negotiation, which rendered the issue of it fruitless. But we have already seen, that it was the French Executive Council, which rendered the negotiation fruitless, by refusing to accept the conditions proposed by the British Government. Besides, if an order sent to Mr. Chauvelin

France, than by the Dey of Algiers, (34) they would have arrested him, as ~~an~~ exciter of sedition, and have searched his papers. In fact, any government whatsoever, which was not anxious to leave nothing unattempted, that might avert hostilities, would have refused Mr. Chauvelin, who was much more an apostle of rebellion than a minister of peace, to remain, after he had threatened an appeal to the people in his note of the 27th of December. How much more then was it allowable, to dismiss him on the 24th of January, when all means of reconciliation had been exhausted, and the fixed determination of his employers, to attack Great Britain at all events, had been fully proved?

Chauvelin to return to France be called shutting the door to the negotiation, the charge will again fall on the Executive Council, because they ordered Mr. Chauvelin to return, *even before* the British Government did.

(34) Witness the imprisonment of the Portuguese Ambassador in Paris.

Nor could it be said, that the British Government dismissed a French *Ambassador*: for Mr. Chauvelin, *at that time*, had no claim whatsoever to the title. He had been accredited by Louis XVI. and, as long as the King of France was still alive, Mr. Chauvelin, by virtue of the credentials which the British Government had received, might at least pretend that he was the accredited Minister of France. But, after the death of the King of France, who was executed on the 21st of January, those credentials had ceased to be valid, and Mr. Chauvelin, therefore, could be considered only as a part of the general mass of foreigners resident in England. The new letters of credence from the Executive Council, which he had offered on the 17th of January, had been refused for the reasons already assigned. His forfeited diplomatic character, therefore, was not restored: for, before any individual acquires the privilege of an Ambassador, his

letters of credence must be first accepted by the government, to which he is designed to be accredited. (35) Consequently, by the death of Louis XVI. the sole hinderance to the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin, after the negotiation had been ended, was removed : and the cogent motives, which induced the British Government, at that time, to send away every stranger, which endeavoured to excite insurrection, operated unrestrained.

Lastly, *under the existing circumstances*, after it was certain that Great Britain would be attacked at all events, the British Government might surely be permitted to express its indignation at a cruel and wanton execution which filled all Europe with horror. It was surely allowable to remove, even with tokens of displeasure, the agent of those who had not only brought their own fove-

• (35) The modern rulers of France have, of all men, the least right to call this position in question.

reign to the block, but openly threatened his Britannic Majesty with a similar fate, (36) and Great Britain itself with destruction. It was allowable, not indeed to engage in a war with France, *merely* because the French had executed their king, (37) but certainly to censure the cruelty of his judges, when those very judges were determined to engage in a war with Britain. And it was not only allowable, but even necessary, to render popular a war which could no longer be avoided, to place the actions of the French rulers in the light which they deserved, to contribute to the indignation which was generally excited by their cruel conduct, and, by directing the sentiments of Britons to their proper channel, rouse them to a vigorous re-

(36) Ch. xiv. Note 28.

(37) Of this charge, which has been very falsely laid to the British Ministry, the present work contains a complete refutation, by proving that the French rulers not only declared war, but provoked it.

stance

sistance against an implacable enemy, which had resolved “ to set fire to the four corners “ of Europe.” When, to these reasons, we add the urgent motives which at that time induced the British Government to remove every foreigner who acted like Mr. Chauvelin, we shall no longer be surprised at the following note which was sent to him by Lord Grenville on the 24th of January : “ I am “ charged to notify to you, Sir, that the “ character with which you had been invested at this court, and the functions of “ which have been so long suspended, being “ now entirely terminated by the fatal death “ of his Most Christian Majesty, you have “ no longer any public character here. The “ King can no longer, after such an event, “ permit your residence here. (38) His “ Majesty has thought fit to order, that you

(38) It is remarkable that this passage was omitted in that copy of the French original which appeared in the *Moniteur*, 31st January, 1793, and runs thus : “ Je suis chargé de vous notifier que le caractère dont vous

“ should retire from this kingdom within the
 “ term of eight days ; and I herewith transf-

avez été chargé auprès du Roi vient d'être terminé par la mort funeste de S. M. T. C. Sa Majesté juge à propos que vous sortiez du royaume dans l'espace de huit jours. Je vous envoie un passeport pour vous et votre suite. Je prendrai toutes les précautions pour que vous entriez en France avec les égards dus à un Ministre qui avait été accrédité auprès du Roi par sa Majesté très-chrétienne.” The passage, however, which

the French rulers thought proper to omit, has, together with a similar one in his Majesty's message to the two Houses of Parliament, been used in Great Britain as an argument, that Mr. Chauvelin was dismissed merely in consequence of the execution of Louis XVI. That he was dismissed in consequence of that event is certain : but we must not, therefore, conclude, that he was dismissed *merely* in consequence of that event, since it has been shewn that, independently of that event, there existed very urgent motives for his dismissal, and that it was the death of the king of France which removed the only obstacle to their operation. The execution of the King of France, therefore, may in *this* sense be said to have occasioned the removal of Mr. Chauvelin. But even if this argument be deemed inconclusive, and it be still asserted that Mr. Chauvelin was ordered to leave England for no other reason, than because the King of France had been put to death, we can deduce no other inference,

I submit to you a copy of the order which his
 " Majesty, in his Privy Council, has given to
 " this effect. I send you a passport for your-
 " self and your suite: and I shall not fail to
 " take all the other necessary steps, in order
 " that you may return to France with all the
 " attentions which are due to the character
 " of Minister Plenipotentiary from his Most
 " Christian Majesty, which you have exer-
 " cised at this court." After all, should the
 arguments alleged in justification of the or-
 der, communicated to Mr. Chauvelin on the

inference, than that the British Government *unneces-*
sarily furnished its enemy with a pretext for declaring
 war, as, on the other hand, if the validity of the above-
 assigned reasons for his dismissal be admitted, the pre-
 text was not unnecessarily afforded, to which the British
 Government, in other respects, had no great necessity
 for attending, since they who are resolved on war, as it
 has been proved that the French rulers were long before
 the 24th of January, are seldom at a loss for pretences,
 and in the list of grievances, with which the declaration
 of war was accompanied, the dismissal of Mr. Chau-
 velin really made only *one* among *eighteen*.

24th of January, be thought unsatisfactory, and should any one be still of opinion, that the British Ministry would have acted more prudently, if they had waited till hostilities had been formally declared, which, from the reasons assigned in the fourteenth chapter, it was easy to foresee would soon take place, yet the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin can in no case be numbered among the *causes* of the war, because it has been unanswerably proved, that the French rulers had determined on a war with England and Holland *before* that event. (39)

(39) Yet a certain Opposition writer, in defiance of all documents, has ventured to assert that, before the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin, "France was, undoubtedly solicitous for peace," whence, in order to throw the whole blame of the war on the British Ministry, he would have his readers conclude that it was that event which *first* excited the idea of a war with England in the minds of those *pacific* rulers of republican France. On this subject, however, I beg leave to refer his readers to the seventh, tenth, twelfth, and fourteenth chapters of the present work, which relate to a period

On the 25th of January, copies of all the Notes, which had been exchanged during the late negotiation between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, were laid before the States General by Lord Auckland, the British Ambassador at the Hague, as the issue of it affected Holland in an equal degree with Great Britain. It was necessary to inform the government of that country, which was the most exposed to an attack, that the French Executive Council had rejected the conditions of peace which had been offered by

prior to the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin. When the same writer says in another place, that Mr. Chauvelin was dismissed, because Ministers were resolved to accept of no conditions of peace from France, he must have forgotten that it was the British Government which offered conditions of peace, and that it was the French Government which rejected them. See the latter part of Ch. xiii.—It must be granted, however, that the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin has found a very proper place in the pamphlet in question, because it is so far from being a view of the *causes* of the war, that it is literally a view of the *pretexts* for it.

the British Government, that it still insisted as well on the opening of the Scheldt, as on the occupying the Austrian Netherlands with a French army during its own pleasure, and that it had given, as its ultimatum, the assurance that, if the naval preparations in the British ports were continued, which Great Britain had commenced in self-defence, and which, as the proposed conditions were rejected, could not possibly be stopped, *it would prepare for war.* (40) The copies of the papers, relative to the negotiation, were accompanied, likewise, with a note, in which Lord Auckland arraigned the conduct of the French rulers. He complained that, though they assumed the title of philosophers, they endeavoured to destroy the received notions of subordination, manners, and religion, which had hitherto founded the security, the happiness, and the consolation of the human

(40) See the latter part of the note of the Executive Council of Jan. 7.

race. He complained that, though the British Government, as well as the States General, had observed the most strict neutrality, and had carefully avoided all interference in the internal affairs of France, the rulers of that country endeavoured to excite an insurrection both in England and in Holland, while they were taking every measure for an invasion with a French army. But he assured the States General, that the British Government was determined to support its allies, to fulfil the conditions of the treaty of 1788, and to protect, to the utmost of its power, the United Provinces from the depredations of France. He reminded them of a small squadron which had lately sailed from the Downs to protect the coast of Zealand; (41) and then declaring the readiness

(41) This small squadron consisted of a ship of 50 guns, two frigates of 36 guns, and four vessels of inferior force, and left the Downs at the beginning of January, under the orders of Commodore Murray.

of the British Cabinet to co-operate with the States General in the defence of the United

That it was designed merely to act on the defensive, was admitted in the Journal de Paris, 12 Janv. 1793, where, after mention had been made of some Dutch ships, which had been ordered to join it, was added, " Cette petite armée navale combinée a le double but, de garder la Zélande, et de défendre l'ouverture de l'Escaut." That this small combined squadron was not designed to act on the offensive, appears further from the order sent by the States General to the Dutch Commodore, which in the words of the Moniteur, 30 Janv. 1793, run thus. " Que dans le cas où des navires français armés se présenteront pour descendre la rivière il les laisse passer; mais en protestant, que si quelque navire prétend la monter, il tâche d'abord de l'en dissuader avec douceur, que cette voie se trouvant infructueuse, il montre de la fermeté; qu'enfin, au besoin il repousse la force par la force." It was this small squadron to which Dumouriez alluded in his letter to Miranda of the 10th of January, in which, speaking of the French gun vessels, which had already sailed up the Scheldt, and then lay before Antwerp, he gave Miranda the following information: " Le Ministre de la Marine donne ordre de préparer des fourneaux et des grils sur chacune des trois chaloupes canonnières pour pouvoir tirer à boulets rouges. Ces trois batimens ti-

rent

Provinces, he concluded in the following words: "Your High Mightinesses have acknowledged these dispositions of his Majesty in what he has done already. You will not find them abated in the preparations that are now making. In consequence of which his Majesty is persuaded that he will continue to experience, on the part of your High Mightinesses, a perfect conformity of principles and conduct. That conformity can alone give to the united efforts of the two countries the necessary energy for their common defence, which will also oppose a barrier to the

rent peu d'eau, et chasseroient facilement les frégates, par la supériorité de leur calibre de vingt-quatre, et par leurs boulets rouges." Correspondence du Général Miranda, p. 5. Miranda, however, replied on the 15th of January, (*Ib.* p. 8.) that the French gun vessels would not be able to beat off the combined squadron; and the intended attack on Zealand was deferred. The assistance, therefore, sent to the Dutch arrived at a very seasonable juncture.

“ evils with which Europe is threatened,
“ and secure from every attempt the safety,
“ tranquillity, and independence of a state,
“ the happiness of which is insured by your
“ High Mightinesses, through the wisdom
“ and energy of its government. (42)

(42) Certain Opposition writers, who have extolled the *temperateness* of the language used by the French rulers toward the British Government, have not only severely censured some expressions in this note of Lord Auckland, but have applied them to palliate, at least, if not to justify, the declaration of hostilities against Great Britain. More wretched sophistry, however, cannot well be devised: for when the National Convention declared war on the 1st of February, it had no knowledge of this note. Consequently, it cannot be reckoned even among the *pretexis* for war, much less among the causes of it. That the note was unknown to the National Convention, when war was declared on the 1st of February, is evident from the circumstance that no mention whatsoever was made of it, either in the debates, or in the list of grievances. See the *Moniteur*, 2d and 3d Feb. 1793. Nor did it appear in the *Moniteur*, at that time the official paper of the French Government, before the *sixth* of February. On the other hand, if a copy of it had really reached Paris

Three days after the British Ambassador
at the Hague had delivered to the States

Paris before the first of February, the omission of it in the list of grievances will prove that the French rulers themselves had no objections to make it. In either case, therefore, it cannot be numbered among the pretexts for war.—That it contains some warm expressions, which it is prudent to avoid in all diplomatic communications, cannot be denied: but then it must not be forgotten, that it was delivered to the States General after the negotiation with France was at an end, after war was fully decided, though not openly declared, after the British Government had been loaded with a series of injuries and insults, after the most opprobrious language had been used by the French rulers, even while the negotiation was pending, and lastly, that it was drawn up under the impression of the intelligence just arrived at the Hague of the condemnation of Louis XVI. To enable the reader, however, to judge whether it contains any thing, which bears the most distant resemblance to the menacing language, which had been already repeatedly used by the French rulers, I will subjoin the *whole* note in the French original, as printed in the *Moniteur*, 6th Feb. 1793.

Hauts et Puissans Seigneurs,

Le soussigné Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de S. M. Britannique, s'empresse en conséquence

General the papers relative to the late negotiation, the following message was sent from his Majesty to the House of Commons :

quence des ordres exprès du Roi, de mettre sous les yeux de vos Hautes Puissances des copies de toutes les pieces qui ont été échangées depuis le 27 Décembre, dernier jusqu'au 20 de ce mois, entre Lord Grenville, Secrétaire d'Etat de S. M. et M. Chauvelin. Le Roi, Hauts et Puissans Seigneurs, est dans la ferme persuasion que les sentimens et les principes, exprimés au nom de la Grande-Bretagne, sont parfaitement conformes à ceux qui animent votre république, et que vos Hautes Puissances sont disposées à concourir pleinement aux mesures que la crise actuelle exige, et qui sont une suite nécessaire de ces sentimens et de ces principes. Les circonstances qui nous ont menés à cette crise, sont trop récentes, et la conduite du Roi est trop connue, pour que le soussigné soit dans le cas d'entrer dans de longs détails. Il n'y a pas encore quatre ans, que quelques malheureux, se qualifiant du nom de philosophes, ont eu la présomption de se croire capables d'établir un nouveau système de société civile. Afin de réaliser ce rêve de la vanité, il leur a fallu bouleverser et détruire toutes notions reçues de subordination, des mœurs, et de religion, qui ont fait jusqu'ici la sûreté, le bonheur et la consolation du genre humain. Leurs projets de destruction n'ont que trop réussi; mais les effets

“ His Majesty has given directions for laying before the House of Commons, copies

effets du nouveau système qu'ils ont voulu introduire, n'ont servi qu'à démontrer l'ineptie et la scélératesse de ses auteurs. Les événemens qui se sont si rapidement succédés depuis lors, surpassent en atrocité tout ce qui a jamais souillé la page de l'histoire. Les propriétés, la liberté, la vie même, ont été les jouets de la rage effrénée des passions de l'esprit de rapine, de la haine, de l'ambition la plus cruelle et la plus dénaturée. Les annales du genre humain ne présentent pas d'époque, où dans un aussi court espace de tems on ait commis tant de crimes, causé tant de malheurs, fait verser tant de larmes : enfin, dans ce moment même, ces horreurs paraissent être parvenues à leur comble. Pendant tout ce tems, le Roi environné de son peuple, qui jouissait par la protection divine d'une prospérité sans exemple, n'a pu voir les malheurs d'autrui qu'avec un pressentiment profond de pitié et d'indignation ; mais, fidelle à ses principes, S. M. ne s'est jamais permis de s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures d'une nation étrangère. Elle ne s'est jamais écartée du système de neutralité qu'elle avait adopté. Cette conduite que le Roi a vu avec plaisir observée également par vos Hautes Puissances, dont toute l'Europe a reconnu la bonne foi, et qui aurait dû être respectée à tant d'autres titres, n'a pas réussi à mettre la Majesté, ses peuples et cette ré-
publique,

“ of several papers which have been received /
“ from Mr. Chauvelin, late Minister Pleni-

publique, à l'abri des trames les plus dangereuses et les plus criminelles. Depuis quelques mois, des projets d'ambition et d'agrandissement, alarmans pour la tranquillité et la sûreté de l'Europe entière, ont été publiquement avoués. On s'est efforcé de répandre dans l'intérieur de l'Angleterre, et de ce pays, des maximes subversives de tout ordre social, et l'on n'a pas même eu honte de donner à ces détestables tentatives le nom de pouvoir révolutionnaire. Des traités anciens et solennels, garantis par le Roi, ont été enfreints; et les droits et les territoires de la république ont été violés. Sa Majesté a donc cru dans sa sagesse devoir faire des préparatifs proportionnés à la nature des circonstances. Le Roi a consulté son parlement, et les mesures que sa Majesté avait trouvé bon de prendre, ont été accueillies par l'assentiment vif et unanime d'un peuple qui abhorre l'anarchie et l'irreligion, qui aime son Roi et qui veut sa constitution. Tels sont, Hauts et Puissans Seigneurs, les motifs d'une conduite, dont la sagesse et l'équité ont assez prouvé jusqu'ici au Roi votre concert et votre co-opération. Sa Majesté, dans tout ce qu'elle a fait, a constamment veillé au maintien des droits et de la sûreté des Provinces Unies. La déclaration que le Souverain a eu l'honneur de remettre à vos Hautes Puissances le 13 Novembre dernier, et l'arrivée d'une petite escadre

“potentiary from the Most Christian King,
 “by his Majesty’s Secretary of State for Fo-
 “reign Affairs, and of the answers returned
 “thereto; and likewise the copy of an or-
 “der made by his Majesty in Council, and
 “transmitted by his Majesty’s commands to
 “the said Mr. Chauvelin, in consequence of
 “the accounts of the atrocious act recently

escadre destinée à protéger les parages de la république,
 pendant que ses propres forces se rassemblaient, en
 fournissent la preuve. Vos Hautes Puissances ont re-
 connu ces dispositions du Roi dans tout ce que sa Ma-
 jesté a déjà fait. Elles ne les retrouveront pas moins
 dans les mesures qui se préparent. En conséquence,
 sa Majesté se persuade qu’elle continuera à éprouver de
 la part de vos Hautes Puissances une parfaite conformité
 de principes et de conduite. Cette conformité peut
 seule donner aux efforts réunis des deux pays, l’énergie
 nécessaire pour leur commune défense, opposer une
 barrière aux maux dont l’Europe est menacée, et met-
 tre à l’abri de toute atteinte, la sûreté, la tranquillité et
 l’indépendance d’un état dont vos Hautes Puissances as-
 surent le bonheur par la sagesse et la fermeté de leur
 gouvernement.

AUCKLAND.

Fait à La Haye, le 25 Janvier, 1793.

“perpe-

“perpetrated in Paris. In the present situa-
“tion of affairs, his Majesty thinks it indis-
“pensably necessary to make a further aug-
“mentation of his forces by sea and land;
“and relies on the known affection and
“zeal of the House of Commons to enable
“his Majesty to take the most effectual mea-
“sures, in the present important conjunc-
“ture, for maintaining the security and
“rights of his own dominions; for support-
“ing his allies; and for opposing views of
“aggrandizement and ambition on the part
“of France, which would be, at all times
“dangerous to the general interests of Eu-
“rope, but are peculiarly so, when connected
“with the propagation of principles which
“lead to the violation of the most sacred
“duties, and are utterly subversive of the
“peace and order of all civil society.” (43)

(43) A similar message was sent at the same time to the House of Lords.

While

While the British Government was thus engaged in preparing new measures of defence, and daily expected to hear of a declaration of war against Great Britain and Holland, General Dumouriez formed, or appeared to form, the resolution of attempting a new negotiation. It has been already related in the twelfth chapter, that the order of the Executive Council, for the immediate invasion of the United Provinces was communicated by General Dumouriez, on the 10th of January, to General Miranda: and, it is evident, from his whole letter, that the project of invasion, if not proposed by him, had at least his complete approbation. (44)

(44) See Ch. xii. Notes 51, 52, where two long extracts are quoted from his letter, which clearly prove his approbation of the intended attack on the United Provinces, though every one who reads the first chapter of his Memoirs, without being acquainted with his private correspondence, would suppose the contrary. In his letter to Miranda, he even called the plan *his own*, and said immediately after the passage quoted in Ch. xii.

We have seen, likewise, that the only reason why the project was not executed in the middle of January, was the want of magazines, which prevented Miranda from putting his troops in motion at the instant; and that the Executive Council, on Miranda's representations, entered into a resolution on the 18th of January, by which it was not aban-

Note 52: "Je vous développerai *mon plan* de jour en jour." In the same letter he gave, likewise, to Miranda the following advice, in order to defray the expences of the expedition: "Faites vous donner une liste des capitalistes d'Anvers; appelez-les nominativement à l'hôtel de ville, faites-les y garder, et ne les relâchez pas, qu'ils n'aient pris une résolution et rempli l'emprunt, ou de bon gré ou forcément. Si c'est de bon gré, *touchez tout de suite deux millions de florins, pour les frais de l'expédition.* Si c'est forcément, imposez-les; l'un à cinquante mille florins, l'autre plus, l'autre moins, selon leurs facultés; et *faites-les payer sous huitaine, en les faisant garder à vue chez eux.*" An additional proof, that Dumouriez wholly approved of the invasion of Holland, is contained in his letter to Miranda of the 19th of January, which will be quoted presently.

done,

done, but only deferred. (45) That *part* of it, indeed, which related to Zealand, a province consisting entirely of islands, had, in consequence of the seasonable arrival of a fleet of English and Dutch frigates, from which Miranda apprehended effectual resistance, (46) been so far altered, that it had been determined, either to make a false attack only on that quarter, or to leave the invasion of Zealand to the persons who called themselves Dutch patriots. But this partial arrangement had not affected the general plan; for the resolution to invade the United

(45) See Ch. xii. Note 53.

(46) In his letter to Dumouriez of the 15th of January, he said: "Si vous laissez dehors de votre plan l'entreprise de la Zélande, il serait beaucoup plus praticable, à ce qu'il me paraît, et nous n'aurions pas à nous compromettre avec les forces maritimes de l'Angleterre et de la Hollande, qui ne laisseraient pas de nous arrêter au commencement même de notre entreprise, n'ayant pas de notre part des forces maritimes à leur opposer." *Correspondance du Général Miranda*, p. 8.

Provinces remained unaltered. On the 19th, of January, Dumouriez, who was then in Paris, had written to Miranda, "I am of
 " opinion that, if the war with England
 " and Holland is determined, (47) only a
 " false attack must be made on Zealand, that
 " we must make ourselves masters of Maef-
 " tricht, Venlo, Geldres, and Emmerick,
 " take the route of Nimeguen and the
 " heights of Amersfort, turn Utrecht, gain
 " the sluice of Muiden, in which Marshal
 " Luxembourg failed in 1672, and thus we
 " shall arrive without difficulty at Amster-
 " dam. In this campaign, which ought to
 " be very rapid, *and on which I have long me-*
 " *ditated,* (48) we must consider the patriots
 " only as a trifling accession, and we must
 " trust to our own forces alone, and to the

(47) Dumouriez well knew at that time that it *was* determined, though he did not *say* so to Miranda. See the former part of Ch. xiv.

(48) This passage deserves particular notice.

" means

“ means of conquest. (49) Zealand then
 “ falling of itself, with the Isle of Walche-
 “ ren, however strongly it may be fortified,
 “ becomes a poor retreat for the House of
 “ Orange, and the Administration of the
 “ country, because we shall join the Dutch
 “ marine to our own artillery, to penetrate
 “ thither, when nothing more remains.” (50)

(49) Yet in the manifesto, with which the invasion of Holland was soon afterwards accompanied, it was asserted that the French came merely as *friends and deliverers*.

(50) “ Je crois que si la guerre est décidée entre nous et la Hollande et l'Angleterre, il ne faut faire qu'une fausse attaque sur la Zélande, que nous devons occuper Maestricht, Venlo, Gueldres, Emmerick, nous rabattre sur Nimégue et par les hauteurs d'Amersfort, tourner Utrecht, gagner l'écluse de Muyden que le Maréchal Luxembourg a manqué en 1672, alors nous arrivons sans difficulté à Amsterdam. Dans cette campagne, qui doit être très prompte, et que j'ai long-tems méditée, il ne faut compter les patriotes que comme un léger accessoire, et ne se fier qu'à ses propres forces

On the 23d of January Dumouriez again wrote to Miranda, and likewise from Paris :
 “ I have informed you, my dear Miranda,
 “ that I have abandoned, as well as yourself,
 “ the project of Zealand : but this is an ad-
 “ ditional reason for *pushing, with the utmost*
 “ *vigour, that of the attack on Maestricht,*
 “ *Venlo, and Nimeguen.* I shall give, how-
 “ ever, to Caock and Bendels (51) the small
 “ succour which they require, in the opinion
 “ they entertain of succeeding with three
 “ or four thousand men, which is all that
 “ they have demanded of the Executive

et aux moyens de conquêtes. La Zélande alors tombée d'elle-même et l'Isle Walcheren, fût-elle rendue inexpugnable, devient une pauvre retraite pour la Maison d'Orange et pour les administrations du pays, parceque nous joindrons tous les moyens de la marine Hollandaise à tous nos moyens d'artillerie, pour y pénétrer, lorsque nous n'aurons plus que cela à faire.” Correspondance du Général Miranda, p. 11.

(51) Is not this an erratum for Daendels?

“ Council,

“ Council. In a few days I myself shall examine the whole matter on the spot.” (52)

Such were the circumstances under which the resolution, in other respects apparently meritorious, of commencing a new negotiation with Great Britain and Holland, was formed by General Dumouriez; (53) in

(52) “ Je vous ai mandé, mon cher Miranda, que j’abandonnais, comme vous, le projet de la Zélande; mais c’est une raison de plus pour pousser très-vigoureusement celui de l’attaque de Maëstricht, Venlo et Nimègue. Je donnerai cependant peut-être à Caock et Bendels le petit secours qu’ils réclament, dans l’opinion où ils sont de réussir avec trois ou quatre mille hommes, qui est tout ce qu’ils ont demandé au Conseil Exécutif. J’examinerai cela moi-même sur les lieux sous peu de jours.” *Ib.* p. 14.

(53) It was in the letter of the 23d of January, in which he so strongly recommended to Miranda, vigorously to push the sieges of the Dutch fortified towns, Maëstricht, Venlo, and Nimeguen, that he gave Miranda the first intelligence of the intended negotiation, and at the same time mentioned, that he himself was the person who was to conduct it. The circumstance,

which, if the National Convention had permitted the execution of it, we should undoubtedly have heard as many gasconades about *pacific dispositions and purity of intentions*, as in the late negotiation with Mr. Chauvelin. The whole project was evidently the work of Dumouriez alone: for the Executive Council took so little part in it, that of the five Ministers, Le Brun, Garat, Claviere, Pache, and Monge, of which it was then composed, (54) the three last opposed it with all their force; (55) and Le Brun, that in the same letter (*Ib.* p. 16), he desired Miranda to keep the matter a profound secret, looked likewise mysterious.

(54) Roland, the Minister of the Interior, was at that time on the point of retiring, and no longer took part in public affairs, at least not in what related to foreign countries. See that chapter of the *Memoirs of Dumouriez*, which is entitled *Retraite de Roland*.

(55) Dumouriez, speaking of the proposal of it, which he made to the Executive Council (*Mémoires*, tom. i. p. 130), says: "Claviere, Pache, et Monge s'opposèrent de toute leur force à cette proposition."

though

though he was too fine a politician to *declare* himself against it, in which case, as he was Minister for Foreign Affairs, it could not have been set on foot, took care, however, as we shall presently see, that it should produce no effect. And as to Garat, who was the man that read the sentence of death to Louis XVI, and has since behaved with uncommon insolence to the sister of the late Queen of France, a *sincere* desire to promote a work of moderation and peace, would have been wholly inconsistent with his character. Nor does Dumouriez himself appear to have had any other object in view, than to amuse a little longer the English and Dutch Governments, (56) as, toward the end of January, some obstacles presented themselves to the intended invasion of Holland. (57)

(56) This will be rendered, at least, highly probable in a following note.

(57) This will presently appear from his own description.

To set, however, the negotiation, or rather pretended negotiation, on foot, two persons, De Maulde and Maret, (58) were dispatched from Paris, the one to the Hague, the other to London. "It was determined," says Dumouriez, (59) "that De Maulde, "under the pretence of settling his personal "affairs, should repair to the Hague, that "Noel should be recalled and placed else- "where, and that the General (Dumouriez) "should furnish De Maulde with a letter to "Lord Auckland, signifying, that he should "arrive at Antwerp on the 1st of February, "to inspect the winter quarters of his army, "and that, as he had learnt from his friend, "De Mauide, that his Lordship had spoken "of him with respect and confidence, it "would be very agreeable to him if an op-

(58) De Maulde had been French Ambassador at the Hague, whence he was lately returned. With Mr. Maret the reader is already acquainted.

(59) *Mémoires*, tom. i. p. 130.

"portunity

“ opportunity presented itself of conferring
 “ with Lord Auckland on the frontiers, be-
 “ cause the conference might be beneficial
 “ to human kind in general, and to the two
 “ nations in particular. It was determined,
 “ likewise, that if Lord Auckland, as was
 “ expected, gave his consent, the General
 “ should hold a conference, and that he
 “ might thence, in case it were necessary,
 “ even go over to England. As soon as De
 “ Maulde (says Dumouriez further) (60) ar-
 “ rived at the Hague, at the latter end of Ja-
 “ nuary, he immediately waited on Lord
 “ Auckland, and delivered to him the letter
 “ of General Dumouriez. *This Minister ex-*
 “ *pressed great pleasure at the proposal,* and said
 “ to De Maulde that, as the interests of
 “ England and Holland were inseparable, he
 “ would communicate the proposal to the
 “ Grand Pensionary, Van Spiegel, and deli-

“berate with him on the subject. The
“latter likewise consented to take part in
“the conference with Lord Auckland and
“General Dumouriez. His Lordship sent
“three successive packet boats to England :
“and De Maulde sent his Secretary to Ant-
“werp, where the General, after having
“visited the coast from Dunkirk to that
“place, arrived on the 2d of February. Hav-
“ing every where found the greatest dis-
“order on his whole journey from Paris (as
“Dumouriez further relates) (61) and per-
“ceiving that his embarrassments were daily
“increasing, the General greatly rejoiced at
“the progress which De Maulde had made
“in the negotiation. He sent immediately
“a courier to Le Brun with the original
“answer of Lord Auckland, who had in-
“formed him, that the Grand Pensionary of
“Holland, and himself, were agreed to come

(61) *Ib.* 140.

“ to the borders, in order to hold the conference with the General ; that he had dispatched several packet boats to England, to obtain the consent of his Court, and instructions relative to the conference ; (62)

(62) Pour en obtenir la permission et des instructions relatives à cette conférence. The circumstance that Lord Auckland, before he could hold the conference, was obliged to send to England, not only for instructions, but even for *permission* to hold it, sufficiently proves, that the British Ministers were not the movers of the new negotiation. It is true that, according to the account of Dumouriez (*Mémoires*, tom. i. p. 128), before De Maulde had given up his former embassy at the Hague, he had been assured by Lord Auckland, that the British Cabinet would have no objection to negotiate with General Dumouriez : and it appears, likewise, (*Ib.* p. 128) that Mr. Pitt himself had expressed himself to the same purpose. On what particular occasions these declarations were made, or what was the conversation which gave rise to them, Dumouriez has not related : but in regard to the time, they cannot have been made later than the end of December. For De Maulde, on his return from his former embassy at the Hague, arrived at Paris within a few days after Dumouriez, who arrived there on the 1st of January (*Ib.* p. 39, 128) ;

“ that the answer would soon arrive, and
 “ that it was by no means his design to

128) : and the French agent, Benoît, who had brought the account, that Mr. Pitt would have no objection to negotiate with General Dumouriez, arrived there at the same time (*Ib.* p. 128). This precise determination is not superfluous, because, after the 13th of January, the day on which the ultimatum of the Executive Council was delivered, all hopes of preserving peace had vanished. *After that time*, therefore, it could not occur to the British Ministry to *propose* another negotiation, though, at the end of the month, when De Maulde himself proposed it, they very prudently consented, not only because a refusal would have exposed them to the reproach of having neglected an opportunity to prevent a rupture, but because, however well founded the expectations of a war may be, yet, till it has been actually declared, there always remains at least a *possibility* of the contrary. Mr. Pitt, however, declared in the House of Commons on the 1st of February, (see the debates of that day) that he considered it as in the highest degree improbable, that a new negotiation would produce any effect : and experience proved how rightly he judged, for it was on that very day that the National Convention, refusing to wait the issue of the negotiation, declared war on Great Britain and Holland.

Since then the British Government acted a mere
passive

“ amuse the General, or to delay his plans
 “ and preparations for the next campaign.

passive part in this business, all suspicion of a design to amuse the French Government, by the negotiation, must fall of itself to the ground; and it is obvious that, when preparations are made for a negotiation, it is the party only which makes those preparations, and not the party which simply gives its assent, that can be exposed to such a suspicion. It is very extraordinary, therefore, that Dumouriez, could venture to write (*Mémoires*, tom. i. p. 137) “ on pourrait croire que le Ministre Pitt n'aurait voulu qu'amuser le Général Dumouriez :” and his pretended proof is still more extraordinary, namely, “ le traité de la cour de St. James avec celle de Turin, qui est de la même époque, confirme cette opinion.” This assertion, which other writers, British as well as French, have faithfully copied without enquiring into its truth, contains so gross an error, as is hardly to be expected from any man who lays claim to the character of an historian. For so far was the treaty with the Court of Turin from being of the same epoch, that not even the *preliminaries* were signed till twelve weeks afterward. They are dated 25th April, 1793, and, as appears from Art. 5, the ratification was to take place within two months after that time. Further, the preliminaries were signed, not at Turin, but in London, which obviates the objection which might otherwise

“The dispatch of De Maulde, with which
 “that of Lord Auckland was accompanied,
 otherwise be made, that the order given by the British
 Cabinet for signing them preceded, by some time, the
 signature itself. Lastly, that hostilities had been de-
 clared against Great Britain before the preliminary ar-
 ticles were even drawn up, appears from the first ar-
 ticle, which begins thus : “Leurs Majestés le Roi de la
 Grande Bretagne et le Roi de Sardaigne, *se trouvant en-*
gagés dans une guerre contre la France, en consequence des
actes les plus injurieux de violence et d'agression. See
 Martens' *Recueil des Principaux Traités.*” Tom. v.
 p. 144—149.

Having shewn that the charge of duplicity, which
 Dumouriez has very artfully laid to the British Minis-
 ters, is wholly unfounded, we will next examine,
 whether he himself was not guilty of that very fault,
 which he has unjustly laid to his opponents. His letter
 to Miranda, of the 23d of January, in which he recom-
 mended to him, vigorously to push the sieges of several
Dutch fortified towns, is certainly not to be reconciled
 with the supposition, that the negotiation, which he was
 planning *at that very time* (See above, Note 53) was
 seriously intended by him as the means of *preventing*
 a war with England and Holland. What other object
 then could he have had in view, but to amuse a little
 longer the English and Dutch Governments, that they
 might

“ explained every thing which had passed
 “ between them. Great indignation had

might be the less prepared for the intended attack? And this is further confirmed by the letter, which he wrote to Miranda from Antwerp on the fifth of February. On this day, strange as it may appear, Dumouriez had no knowledge of the declaration of war: for he himself relates (*Mémoires*, tom. i. p. 142, 143) that Le Brun sent him no information of it, that he first learnt it from the public newspapers, and that not before the *seventh* of February. On the seventh, Miranda, likewise, had received no official intelligence of it, as appears from his letter of that day to the War Minister, Pache. (See *Correspondance du Général Miranda*, p. 20.) Consequently, as Dumouriez, on the 2d of February had received intelligence from Lord Auckland, that he had sent to London for instructions, the interval between the *second* and the *seventh* of February was to Dumouriez a state of uncertainty, in which the dictates of strict integrity certainly enjoined him to abstain from every, at least, unconditional order for the invasion of Holland. Yet, on the *fifth* of February, he wrote from Antwerp to Miranda, and gave him the most positive and unconditional order to take Venlo immediately by surprise, and added, “ je ferai l’investissement de Maestricht avec le reste de la grosse artillerie,